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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

IDEALISM AS TAUTOLOGY OR PARADOX.

IT almost seems as if in America as well as in England a new spirit were stirring in philosophy. Is it the case, or is it only the too sanguine hope of those who do not know, that throughout all the noisy controversy from which we have just emerged, between 'pragmatic' and 'absolutist' versions of idealism, there have been a number of quiet, unobtrusive thinkers scattered here and there in America, unknown even to each other, who have been silently acknowledging their own difficulties with idealism of *any* sort; and who are now about to wake up and join hands? If so, every friend of courageous thinking will feel it to be a matter for congratulation. This realistic movement, if such it verily is, may well change the tone of current philosophical discussion into something less popularly interesting and more truly important than it has been for more than a decade. Idealism is still the storm center of a vigorous controversy. But it would seem, now, as if the idealist would be confronted with a kind of opposition such as his pragmatist brethren could never offer him; an opposition which for good or ill will throw his own position genuinely into relief. For the spirit of realism is the spirit of logical rigor. It may be trusted to 'beat the matter out,' and not weakly drift to a point where it may propose to 'agree to differ.' It is the spirit which is resolved to think and believes that it may know. Whether the idealist has sufficient faith in his own message to rejoice in a genuine re-birth of that spirit may be a matter of doubt. One thing seems certain. If the movement ever comes, the philosophical world will have its opportunity. It will have the chance to measure the idealist's doctrine against something else which is definite and is

definitely different; and thus will be able to judge for itself whether his message has anything in it which really matters or no.

It was perhaps to be expected, if idealism were attacked in a serious way, that many individual idealists should hasten into the breach and declare that *their* special form of the theory was not hit. And there is a risk, perhaps, that any controversial paper such as the present one, which means to be idealistic at least in outlook, may only appear like another individual disclaimer. But its burden is to ask whether the realist school have always attacked the right thing; and it shelters itself behind this fact: that the doctrine which it is to blame them for attacking is one which the classical idealists at least thought that they had left behind. The contention is to be that one main line of realistic argument, perhaps the line which realists are at present most tempted to pursue, is an attack not on idealism but on Berkeley; and that however successfully it may reduce this Berkeleian idealism to tautology or paradox it thereby only reaches the point from which idealism—the idealism which it thinks it has been attacking—takes its start. For all the great idealists from Kant to Green believed that their message differed, and differed not in accidental detail but in principle, from anything which Berkeley had to tell. And the realists' launching out into destructive criticism does not seem to have been preceded by any adequate discussion of what that difference might be held to mean.

It was of course necessary for effective criticism that the object of attack should be defined. 'Idealism' is a term which has been attached to very many different theories. Now, it is the realist's attempt to 'crystallise' out of these the essential form of the modern doctrine, which appears to have miscarried. And I should like first to show the *impasse* to which the attempt has led in some representative realistic writing in England, and then to ask whether a certain apparently larger and more generous realism which has gained some footing in America shows any promise of avoiding the same initial blunder and its results.

The blunder of the critics, as I have hinted, is the confusion of modern idealism with the essential doctrine of Berkeley. What

was the essence of Berkeley's message? It was that what people generally called matter or substance was an abstract idea; and that an abstract idea was only a word. There was no such thing as matter in the then current sense of the term. All that existed, existed 'in the mind.' He expressed this by saying of all things that their *esse* was *percipi*. It has been the fate of Berkeley to be tied down by an unsympathetic criticism to the view that his doctrine referred only to sensation; that, strictly speaking, it was their being 'perceived,' as distinct from their being imagined or believed or what not, that constituted the *esse* of things. But this is probably not where he himself thought the distinction of principle lay. It lay not between their being perceived and, say, their being thought; but between their being *either* perceived or thought and their being 'external to the mind' altogether. If we ask what Berkeley really valued in his own philosophical accomplishment, surely we shall have to say it was his getting things into the mind at all, not the special department of the mind into which he brought them. It would not have alarmed him to have learned regarding certain things that *their esse* consisted in being desired or thought or disliked or felt, so long as thinking, disliking, feeling, etc., were so plainly phenomena of our own inner life. His message was simply that what we call an outer world is really an inner world. The universe is an immaterial universe.

Now, so far as one may gather from the realistic critics, they tend to assume that this is a cardinal principle of idealism still. They attack this. With striking unanimity of result, if not of language, they take up the challenge thrown out by Mr. Bradley: "Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could possibly call a fact . . . and judge if it does not consist in sentient experience," etc.¹ This challenge, which, so far as surface appearance goes, might as well have been thrown out by Berkeley as by Bradley, has been taken up by the school. And they have either met it, or justified themselves in refusing to try to meet it. Their essential criticism has been that if such a 'piece of fact' can not be found, it is only because the demand

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, Chap. XIV.

itself is self-contradictory. 'Find' just *means* 'find in experience.' We are to deny if we can that the experienced is the experienced. We are to think of a thing, for instance, without the aid of thought, to perceive it without perception, to remember or fancy it without the aid of memory or imagination. Of course we cannot. But what the better would we be if we could? In the words of one acute critic: "Reality cannot be thought of as existing, apart from thought. But that is not to say Reality cannot be thought of, as existing apart from thought." "Only a difference of punctuation," says the writer,¹ "but the two statements are wide asunder as the poles." The first is undeniable, but is a tautology. The second is a statement of the utmost importance about the universe, but is wholly unsupported. The great fallacy of idealism has been to take the two as equivalent. Whether, then, we speak of 'sentient experience' with Bradley, or of 'ideas' with Berkeley, or perhaps of 'thought' with some other idealists, the essential contention is taken to be the same—that reality is mental and that such a statement cannot be denied. And the reply is, that in the only sense in which the statement cannot be denied, it is not worth denying.

So far as the idealistic principle is a tautology, then, the critic may refuse to *try* to meet it. But it will not altogether do for the critic to be content with reiterating that this tautology is tautologous. He must go forward to positive criticism. No one means to preach a tautology. And certainly the idealist does not. We are concerned here, then, with the realist's positive refutation of his opponent. We are to fancy him saying to the idealist: "The doctrine which you take that tautology of yours to stand for, is demonstrably false. It is a paradox." We are to ask what it is that is thus supposed paradoxical and false, and what it has to do with idealism. The line of divergence which we fancy we can trace between the English writing which we are to consider, and some prominent writing on the same subject in America, lies in what the two schools respectively think the idealistic 'tautology' is taken to mean by the idealist himself. To both it is something paradoxical; but it is a slightly

¹ D. H. Macgregor, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1906, pp. 782ff.

different paradox to each, so that there is a slight *prima facie* difference in the object which the two schools respectively attack. And while *ultimately*, we hold that both are tilting at the same thing and that the wrong thing, it will be instructive to consider and compare them.

The question is, what is wrong with the idealist's own positive meaning when he says 'reality is experience,' or 'all things are mental'? The answer will depend on the nature of experience, and its relation to what we call its object. And here is how we find the mistake sifted out by Mr. G. E. Moore. Dealing by preference with our sensation-experience and its object, he says: "We all know that the sensation of blue differs from that of green. But it is plain that if both are sensations they must have some point in common. What is it that they have in common?" And he proceeds to call the common element 'consciousness.' "We have, then, in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call consciousness, and another which I call the object of consciousness. This must be so, if the sensation of blue and the sensation of green, though different in one respect, are alike in another."¹ Now, the contention is that we dare not assert the existence of 'blue' when all that we know exists, is a sensation of it. This would be true if 'blue' which is the object of the sensation were its 'content'; but the analysis which resolves every sensation or idea into existence and content is false. 'Blue' can be part of the content of a blue flower; but the only meaning you can give to the assertion that it is the 'content' of a sensation is that it should bear to the sensation the same relation as it bears to the flower; in a word, that it should be a blue sensation with which you are dealing.

As against this he declares the true analysis of a sensation or idea to be as follows: "The element that is common to them all, and which I have called 'consciousness,' really *is* consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of 'knowing' or 'being aware of,' or 'experiencing' something. When we know that the sensation of blue exists, the fact we know is that there exists an awareness of blue. And this awareness is not merely, as we have hitherto

¹ *Mind*, N. S., Vol. 12, p. 444.

seen it must be, itself something distinct and unique, utterly different from blue: it also has a perfectly distinct and unique relation to blue, a relation which is *not* that of thing or substance to content, nor of one part of content to another part of content. This relation is just that which we mean in every case by 'knowing.' To have in your mind 'knowledge' of blue, is *not* to have in your mind a 'thing' or 'image' of which blue is the content. To be aware of the sensation of blue is *not* to be aware of a mental image of a 'thing' of which 'blue' and some other element are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness being used, in both cases, in exactly the same sense. This element, we have seen, is certainly neglected by the 'content' theory: that theory entirely fails to express the fact that there is, in the sensation of blue, this unique relation between blue and the other constituent. And what I contend is that this omission is *not* mere negligence of expression, but is due to the fact that though philosophers have recognized that *something* distinct is meant by consciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of *what* that something is. They have not been able to hold *it* and *blue* before their minds and to compare them, in the same way in which they can compare *blue* and *green*. And this for the reason . . . that when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous."¹

We are now in a position to see what is untrue in the statement 'all things are mental.' It would be a way of saying that the so-called 'contents' of consciousness were really such; which, according to the realist, is not true. These are *objects* of consciousness, not contents. Not all things, then, are mental. 'Objects' make an exception. But if those things which are usually called 'contents of consciousness' (but are really 'objects') are not mental, a question suggests itself as to what things *are* mental. And with this question, we may say at once, the suspicion that the whole attack has been misdirected and has fallen upon nothing important, arises.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 449-50.

As it happens, we do not require to work out an answer to this question, for ourselves. For the same author returns, six years later,¹ to the question of the subject-matter of psychology, a question which he puts in the form "What entities in the universe are properly to be called mental?" We are not surprised to discover here that first among the "mental entities" to be recognized in the universe, are "acts of consciousness." But seeing that this is little more than a translation; seeing that 'act of consciousness' cannot mean really any more than 'whatever has the nature *consciousness* which we discussed before;' it does not take us further than the earlier discussion took us. We are still awaiting the explication of that nature whose name has now been changed from mere 'consciousness' to 'act of consciousness'; so far, we know nothing of it, except simply that it is not 'content.' Now the argument gives promise of such a positive explication. Within the nature which we name 'act of consciousness,' there seems to be provision made for one specimen of that nature differing from another.

"Every mental act consists, at least *in part*, in being conscious. But some of them, I think, plainly consist also in something else. I sometimes merely think of a given proposition, and then, I think, I am merely conscious of it; but I sometimes believe it, and then, besides being conscious of it, I am conscious of it in a certain way—my consciousness of it has a quality which seems to me undoubtedly mental, which differentiates an act of belief from a mere act of consciousness. So, too, I sometimes merely think of a possible future action; but sometimes I will that action; and here again there seems to me to be a real mental difference between the two cases. I should say, then, that the quality which distinguishes an act of will from what is not an act of will, or an act of belief from what is not an act of belief, is undoubtedly a mental entity. And there are, I think, a limited (though still a large) number of entities of this kind."² And these are the subject matter of psychology. Thus we have found our kingdom. Within the field of consciousness itself there are dif-

¹ See *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1909-10, pp. 36 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

ferences; besides mere consciousness there is the believing consciousness, the enjoying consciousness, the perceiving, desiring, willing consciousness, and so forth. These together constitute 'the mental.' But we have no sooner tried to take possession of this inheritance than we begin to doubt our right to it. The question presses: why, if *these* differences between acts of consciousness still permit of our regarding the whole sphere as mental, those other differences between acts of consciousness, which we call their reference to different objects, compel us to break up what seems one sphere into two, the mental and the non-mental. For that there are such differences between the acts is admitted. "When I remember the Crystal Palace, and remember St. Paul's cathedral, there is a . . . difference between the two acts of memory: the one is a consciousness *of* the Crystal Palace, and the other *of* St. Paul's cathedral, and the two acts do certainly differ in respect of the fact that the one is *of* the one entity and the other *of* the other, whether they differ in other respects or not." But to the question why these differences are not mental, the author does not vouchsafe an answer. "This kind of difference does not seem to me to be *itself* a mental difference. I confess I cannot tell *why*. It certainly is a sort of difference which can only obtain between mental acts, since nothing but a mental act can differ from anything else in respect of the fact that the one is a consciousness of one entity and the other is a consciousness of a different entity. But nevertheless, it does not seem to me to be a mental difference." And as to the reason why the other sort of differences *are* mental, the author makes a similar answer. "These qualities [perceiving, remembering, etc.] it seems to me, . . . *are* not themselves acts of consciousness, but are, in some sense, qualities of such. In *what* sense, exactly, I cannot discover. It seems obvious to say that they are mental, because they are qualities of a kind which can *only* belong to acts of consciousness: nothing but an act of consciousness can have the quality of being a volition or being a belief. But then it is also true that nothing but an act of consciousness can have the property of being a consciousness of blue or a consciousness of red and in what way such a property

which I call a 'property' differs from these other properties which I call 'qualities' I cannot define. Assuming, however, that the difference is understood, we may, I think, say that to be 'mental' in this sense, *means* to be a quality (as distinguished from a 'property') which can only belong to an act of consciousness."¹

It appears, then, that the principle which distinguishes what is not mental from what is mental is one of which no account can be given. Some differences between conscious acts are mental and some are not, the author 'cannot tell why.' Now it seems to me that the reader who has read all the way, when he arrives at an avowal like this, can raise only one question: is the statement true? In the process, described earlier, of extruding from the mind all that has no right there, was not a principle present and visibly at work? We make bold to say that the author of so strenuous a piece of original philosophical thinking has no right to be so unjust to himself as to assert that he did not go by a principle *then*; for he did. "Let us consider any act of consciousness, seeing for example. There is nothing more certain to me than that I do constantly see one colour at one time and a different colour at another time, and that though the colours are different, I am conscious of them both in exactly the same sense. It follows, then, that since the colours are different in the two cases, whereas what I mean by consciousness of them is in both cases the same, *my consciousness of a colour must be something different from any of the colours of which I am conscious.*"² There is a principle here. The reason why 'blue' and 'green' are not mental, is that if my perception of blue differs from my perception of green there *must* be a difference between the colors on the one hand and something common to them on the other; and if the one is mental the other cannot be. The idealism which identifies these two things is wrong because in fact a distinction can be perceived between the two. And if the author uses this principle to prove that certain things are *not* mental, he has no right afterwards to use a different principle or to use none, when he is trying to state positively what *is* mental.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 50.

² Italics not the author's.

Only, as can readily be seen, this is a principle which it is absolutely imperative to drop in time. It is easy to foresee how soon it would have us with no 'mind' at all. Objects cannot be 'mental' and yet differ. But amongst these 'mental' acts themselves are there not differences? 'Being conscious of' differs from 'being fond of,' and both from 'being desirous of.' And there is nothing to hinder us in principle from doing here what we did before: placing the differences on the one side and the common element on the other, and confining 'the mental' to the latter. (For we could not call the common element, *i. e.*, 'mere consciousness,' non-mental.) 'The mental,' in that case, cannot cover *all* we imply in 'desiring,' 'willing,' 'believing,' etc., any more than it covers all we imply in 'consciousness of blue.' It covers only what is common to 'being conscious of,' 'desirous of,' 'fond of,' and the rest, however many such 'qualities' of consciousness there may be. And even after restricting the mental to this unknown x common to all 'qualities,' we have not yet found 'the mental,' unless we can be sure that some x' doesn't exist in another range of things which are neither 'qualities' nor 'objects' of acts of consciousness; in which case 'the mental' would be only what was common to x and this new x' .

Here, then, is the source of our suspicion that the whole argument has been misdirected. We have felt the force of the reasoning which proved that not all things are mental. But now, when we ask what *is* so, the only 'mental' nature which we can find is that residuum which is left, when all the positive determinate articulations of mind have been abstracted. And this residuum is admittedly 'diaphanous,' and seems difficult to fix. And no wonder. By its very nature, the point where we are to meet it coincides exactly with the point where all character has evaporated from it. Its being is to be possessor of some zero quality; and this, for reflection, is logically indistinguishable from its being nothing.

The idealistic principle, according to realistic criticism, is a tautology. But to the idealist himself it plainly means something, and we have now considered one version of this, its positive meaning. According to this version, it means that objects

are 'contents' or 'qualities' of consciousness. And we have found very good reasons adduced for saying that on a certain conception of 'mind' such a statement is false. Our only complaint is, that when we ask further what conception of 'consciousness' or 'the mental' it is which has deprived 'objects' of this status, we obtain no satisfactory answer. We have to find an answer for ourselves. And the only answer we can find consistently is one which reduces the mental to a bare residuum which we cannot reach. Much of the writing of the American school would appear to entertain a notion of the positive error of idealistic doctrine, slightly different, at first sight, from the one we have been considering. Its criticism has, indeed, the same anti-Berkeleyan impulse behind it. One main point marked out for attack is still the 'tautology' (however it may be worded) that things are mental or that reality is experience. But this school seems to feel the weakness (if we may put it so) of buying out the idealistic error at so great a cost as the theory which we have just sketched does. They are anxious to show that 'the mind' into which the idealist would scoop up everything, does still hold some things. Their realism strikes a more genial note. They want 'the mind' to remain as the explanation, still, of such things as human society, art, literature and so forth. And they seem to perceive that the other theory must, sooner or later, reduce the mind to a pure indefinable, and that in this form it is useless as a principle of explanation. Hence their argument (I am thinking especially of such an exponent as Professor Perry and those who follow him) is less awkwardly related to life, as was perhaps to be expected from American Philosophy; but the question whether it does not *ultimately* start from the same premises and lead to the same result, is still worth asking.

The immediate difference in spirit, however, is signalled in the attitude taken up towards content of consciousness. 'Content' appears to signify a certain 'status' which objects may acquire. What is emphasised as against idealism is not so much that objects 'are not' consciousness, as that objects, while capable of becoming 'contents' of consciousness, yet remain in their nature 'independent' of it. The 'content-status' is something

which makes no essential difference to the objects which acquire it. The positive false tenet of idealism which must be combated, is a denial of this; the assumption that things *must* be contents of consciousness always. From the circumstance that we never see objects except, so to speak, when they are illuminated by consciousness, the idealist has drawn the unwarranted conclusion that objects are not in their nature independent of that illumination. He has not seen that they may emerge into the light and disappear out of it again, unchanged and unharmed, like a ship crossing the rays of a searchlight on a dark sea. Without metaphor, wherever the real consciously appears, the subject has a complexus of facts there 'for' him, in his apprehension. Now the idealist has assumed that their being necessarily depends on this presence of the mind to them and of them to the mind.

The statement that the object is not dependent on the mind plainly raises two questions. What is meant by 'dependence,' and on what exactly are objects said *not* to depend? As for the former, it is not necessary for us to enumerate all the circumstances whose presence, according to the realist, would render an object genuinely dependent on the mind. We only need to consider one condition which is held to render the assertion of dependence always false. It is false to hold any thing to be dependent on an other, if an explanation of it can be found elsewhere than in that other. We have only to determine, then, what are the objects whose explanation is to be found elsewhere than in the mind. What is meant by "elsewhere than in the mind" may be gathered from the nature of those spheres, other than the social, artistic, literary, etc., which are the peculiar domain of the mental. Whenever, then, a fact, say of mathematics or of natural science, can be explained by the other facts of the science to which it belongs, then *ipso facto* it is not necessarily explained by the mind and therefore is not 'dependent' thereon. To adapt some of Professor Perry's own examples: it is fact, in mathematics, that the three interior angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. But this fact is determined by the logical and mathematical systems to which it belongs. That the planet Jupiter has a certain mean velocity is

fact. But this again can be deduced from the celestial gravitational system. For this reason such facts are independent of that to which the idealist traces everything. You do not need to know 'the mind' in order to know them.

We have to ask, as before, what is the mind, if it is not the thing appealed to in these explanations? For logical, physical, mathematical explanations of facts *appear* to imply reference to something which is mind in some sense. Surely Aristotle's logical system was devised by Aristotle. And if I apprehend the meaning of a mathematical proof, and feel its logical force, and see in virtue of what logical structure it has such force, am I not in some sense thinking Aristotle's thoughts after him? Is not every reference to a scientific system or to mathematical or mechanical principle in some way a dealing with the minds of the great men of history? Their minds were their thoughts, and these are some of their thoughts. True, in order to explain phenomena by the laws of motion, I do not need to recount Kepler's private psychical history. But the conceptions to which I do require to have recourse, are surely his conceptions. They were not his whole mind, but they were part of what went to its make-up, an important part, and a part which I should certainly come across, if I did sketch his history. *This* reference to mind, then, is not what we want to exclude when we are giving a non-mental explanation of a thing. This is not the 'mind' referred to.

But what other sort of reference to the mind is there to exclude? For it is *this* sort of reference to the mind, which characterises explanations in the whole humanistic department of the real also. If one cares to speak in a broad popular way, one can, of course, maintain that there are things which egos do, objects like works of art or human societies which they make out of given materials; and that to explain an object by reference to the ego who made it, is to trace out its dependence on mind. But come to close quarters with any one of those explanations. What is this reference of the thing to the 'mind' which made it? If I set out to explain the *Sistine* Madonna, and cull for my purpose facts such as would make what might be called by Carlyle "a philosophico-

poetical account" of the life of the man who painted it, my account terminating just in his execution of the painting, that would be an explanation. But how could my appeal to this array of facts be proved to be any more an appeal to 'the mind' than if the explanation had been furnished say by a prosaic history of the Italian Renaissance or a materialistic philosophy of history? Which plan for explaining the logarithm or the decimal implies the appeal to 'the mind': the plan of placing each of them in its mathematical context, or that of detailing an interesting part of their inventors' biographies? The fact is, so far as 'necessary reference to the mind' is concerned, both these kinds of explanation are on the same plane. In either case you are putting your facts in an explanatory context. When that context is somebody's mental history, it is then a set of thoughts which you know did once enter into and compose a mind. When it is the mathematical system you do not know this about it. But its character is not thereby changed. It still might have entered into a mind. True, it is not known as any individual's knowledge. But it is still known as a knowledge. And what it is truly known as, that surely it is.

If, now, I am to explain facts by reference to any other sort of mind than this, if I am to explain them by reference to a mind which is not in any sense thus Aristotle's, or Kepler's, or Raphael's or any possible part of these, or of any other, there would seem to be only one thing left for me to do—to derive them necessarily from the one 'mind' which I am sure *is* mind, and which I cannot at all conceive as being anyone else's on which I am looking from without, namely the pure activity of this particular finite psychical center of my own. To this *activity*, be it noted, as distinct from any object whereon it is exercised; because to trace my facts to anything but the activity would be to trace them to a possible mind related to them as Kepler's was to the facts in my mechanical explanation or Aristotle's to those in my logical. Until I can explain some facts thus, I cannot refer anything to that mind to which the idealist refers everything.

What is the real view which such criticism as this ascribes to the idealist? That of making everything dependent on a certain 'consciousness'; and when you look into it, this consciousness

turns out to be a pure activity, which, again, is none other than the psychological counterpart to the logical residuum to which Mr. Moore was driven—his 'diaphanous' residuum from which all differences of conscious states were thought away. For this 'activity' is diaphanous. It is pure *process* of consciousness. Now, we may insist as much as we please that there is such a thing as this process—a process, which isn't its object—that the functions of our minds, perception say, or imagination, or thought, are psychic processes. If we mean by that that they are not contents, then our conviction that such processes exist is a prejudice. When we perceive, there may be such a process going on, but we don't perceive it. We may think about it afterwards, and then 'perceive' that we have gone through a process. But the process through which we then see that we have passed is a content. There is a process of imagination, we say. But the process isn't what we imagine. There is a process of desiring, but we don't desire the process. If we ever either desire or imagine or in any way apprehend any 'process' at all, it is a process which has identified itself with and smelted itself into its own object, one which has turned back upon itself. A *pure* process is a thing nowhere to be found. It is a theoretical abstraction. And if so, our second attempt to fix and combat the positive false tenet of idealism issues in this: that mathematical and physical and many other 'complexes' are not dependent on 'the mind'; but by reason of the principle which says so, nothing else is either, or can be. We set out to consider the general type of argument which would fain refute the statement that *esse* is *percipi*, or reality is experience, or things are mental, under the impression that it was thereby refuting idealism. And we have looked into two forms of this argument, between which there seemed to be a difference. The two agreed that the said principle was really a tautology. But they differed as to the use which idealism makes of its tautology. To the one, idealism uses it to justify the positive doctrine that objects *are* consciousness, *i. e.*, are its 'contents' or 'qualities.' To the other, the idealist's doctrine is that objects are 'dependent' on consciousness. But in the long run, as we said at the outset, the two are tilting at the same thing. The idealist appears to both as having

ascribed an impossible role to 'consciousness.' And it is the same thing which is at the root of both types of criticism when they speak of consciousness. That common element outside of which all differences lie, and this pure activity which is not its own object, are in the end the same. They are found together—and at the exact point where the last vestige of determinate being has vanished from them. So that the criticism taken as a whole, is the same criticism. And we are compelled to say of it, that however true it may be as against the positive doctrine which it ascribes to the idealist and which it proceeds to refute, it really goes further than it means to go. The paradox to which it reduces the idealistic position is a more extreme one than it dreams. On this view, not only would it be untrue that all things are mind or are dependent on mind. It would be untrue that anything is so. For mind and the mental are strictly and finally lost to view.

Now, all that a criticism like this can claim to do, is to send us back to think. It gives no solution of anything. A doctrine that nothing is mental is plainly no better than a doctrine that everything is so. All we can conclude is that the thinking which leads to either of these results has somehow lost its way; if we have reached either conclusion then it behooves us to retrace our steps and see where we have swerved. Where, then, does the path begin which leads to this sorry ending? What exactly is the so-called idealistic discovery which thus turns out so useless? Happily it is not far to look for. It is the discovery that things are ideas, the discovery which Berkeley made.

The criticism has been dealing all along with a fundamentally mistaken notion of what the central interest of idealism is. Idealism has been taken to be a doctrine regarding the matter, when it is throughout a doctrine of the structure, of reality. A critic of idealism who assails any such doctrine as that the universe is psychic, is certainly assailing the wrong thing. Idealism is not an attempt to determine the ultimate stuff of the universe, as one might try to determine from chemistry or physics, what 'matter' is. The idealist looks ahead to see what the universe is made into, not backwards to what it has been made out of. His concern is to show not that the universe is psychic but that

it is 'complete.' By which he means simply that it has an articulate structure, such that the more a man's mind becomes adequate to it, the better that mind itself becomes. In other words, the mind bears in its own deepest nature the clue to the fundamental lines of the structure of things. Not that every man carries in his own soul the ready-made key to all the mysteries of being. The idealist is perfectly awake to the fact that many a person may find the make of his own mind just the poorest possible guide to the way the world is built. But he recognizes that even that mind has a proper excellence of its own, just as the universe has a proper structure. And that that excellence corresponds in its basal lines with the basal lines of the universe. By the time that even that mind comes into harmony with the nature of things, it will find itself at a higher point in the very scale, in the ascent of which, at any given moment of its life, it has already reached some way. This is the central faith of idealism. And if it is a surprise to modern idealists to learn that the justification of such a faith does not at all depend on the discovery of Berkeley, it ought not so to have been. With the masters it was not so. Green had no quarter for Berkeley's 'boyish' idealism. To Fichte it was nothing to say that things were ideas. Such ideas could hardly be looked at without being translated back into things again; which was what he thought happened in Berkeley's case. To these idealists there was a distinction and it was fundamental. "Hegel's reply to Berkeley," says Hutcheson-Stirling, writing in the seventies, "insists on the *ignavia*, the idleness of the position maintained. 'Without is within' says Berkeley. 'Let it be so,' says Hegel, 'and philosophy has still to begin.' The same things that were called *without* or *noumenal*, are now called *within* or *phenomenal*, but, call them as you may, it is their *systematic explanation* that is wanted. Such systematic explanation, embracing man and the entire round of his experiences, sensuous, intellectual, moral, religious, aesthetic, political, etc., is alone philosophy, and to that no repetition of *without is within* or *matter is phenomenal* will ever prove adequate."

J. W. SCOTT.